My research spans several connected areas in theoretical physics, foundations of physics, the history of science, and the conceptual study of scientific knowledge.
Across these areas, I am interested in a recurring set of questions: What exactly do our theories establish about the physical world? Which elements belong to observation, which to mathematical representation, and which arise from interpretation? What assumptions are built into a theory before its predictions are made? And how do scientific concepts acquire stability, authority, and continuity?
My work therefore ranges from problems in quantum theory and spacetime to plasma physics, scientific language, and the history and organization of knowledge.
Foundations & Architecture of Physical Theories
A major part of my research concerns the foundations and conceptual architecture of modern physics.
In quantum theory, I work on measurement, observers, entanglement, quantum witnesses, and the distinction between operational certification and ontological inference- and, most importantly, on the idea of quantum mechanics as an interface theory.
I am also interested in the relation between physical change and time, including the possibility that change is conceptually and physically prior to temporal description.
A further line of work concerns spacetime and geometry: the physical status of dimension, curvature, and geometrical structure, and the extent to which these concepts describe physical reality rather than the representational framework through which reality is organized.
More generally, I study the conceptual primitives, inherited assumptions, inferential structure, and ontological commitments built into physical theories, with a particular focus on the architecture of the major frameworks of modern physics.
Plasma, Collective Behaviour & Causation
Plasma physics provides a concrete setting in which questions about causation, collective behaviour, and levels of description become physically testable.
My work in this area includes Landau damping, collective causation, the relation between particle and fluid descriptions, and the status of collective degrees of freedom.
A central question is whether collective phenomena should be treated merely as convenient descriptions of microscopic dynamics, or whether they possess forms of causal and explanatory autonomy that deserve independent physical recognition.
Scientific Language, Conceptual Honesty & Public Understanding
Another part of my research concerns the language through which science communicates its concepts.
Scientific language is not neutral. Metaphors, simplifications, and inherited expressions can shape how both specialists and the public understand physical theories.
I am particularly interested in conceptual honesty: the responsibility to distinguish between what a scientific theory literally establishes, what is metaphorical or heuristic, and what belongs to interpretation.
This work includes the language used to describe the Big Bang, virtual particles, wave-particle duality, and other concepts whose public presentation can easily blur the boundary between formal description and physical claim.
More broadly, I am interested in the ethics of scientific language and in the vulnerability that arises when conceptual simplifications are mistaken for literal statements about reality.
History of Science, Knowledge & Scientific Credit
My historical work focuses not only on scientific discoveries, but also on the structures that allow knowledge to be created, preserved, transmitted, and attributed.
One long-term project concerns Rabʿ-e Rashidi in Tabriz and the institutional architecture of knowledge: the role of law, finance, organization, labour, education, and memory in sustaining intellectual activity across generations.
I am also interested in the history of scientific method and in the different ways scientific knowledge has been built through theoretical and experimental practice.
Another important strand concerns women in the history of science, particularly questions of collaboration, attribution, archival evidence, and the historical distribution of scientific credit. This includes work on the conditions under which intellectual contributions become visible, invisible, acknowledged, or forgotten.
Across these projects, I treat the history of science not simply as a record of past discoveries, but as a way of understanding how scientific authority and knowledge are constructed.
Exploratory Theoretical Models
Alongside my more developed research programs, I also work on exploratory theoretical models.
These include questions about pre-geometric structure, emergent spacetime, effective gravity, inertia, and the possibility that some familiar physical structures may arise from deeper underlying organization.
I treat these models as exploratory rather than established theories. Their purpose is to test whether alternative conceptual architectures can reproduce known physics while making different assumptions about what is fundamental.
Questions Across These Areas
Despite their diversity, these projects repeatedly return to a small number of underlying problems.
What does an experiment actually establish?
What is introduced by the formalism of a theory rather than directly by observation?
When does empirical success justify an ontological claim?
How should we distinguish between description, explanation, and physical reality?
How do scientific concepts and theories become stabilized, transmitted, and treated as authoritative?
These questions connect my work in quantum foundations, spacetime, plasma physics, scientific language, and the history of science.
Approach
My work combines theoretical and physical analysis with conceptual analysis, historical investigation, and, where appropriate, empirical study.
I do not regard conceptual analysis as a substitute for physics. I use it to identify what a formalism assumes, what an experiment establishes, what an inference requires, and what remains undecided even when a theory is empirically successful.
Likewise, I use the history of science not merely as background, but as evidence about how theories, concepts, methods, and institutions actually develop.
The general aim is to make the architecture of scientific reasoning more explicit: to separate what is observed from what is represented, what is inferred from what is assumed, and what is physically established from what remains interpretive.