Fundamentology

An independent research trajectory in the foundations of physics and science.

Fundamentology is the name I give to an intellectual and research path that began to take shape nearly two decades ago. It is not a university program, an institute, or an institutional affiliation. It developed through years of independent study, writing, and research, and I am now bringing its different lines of inquiry into a more explicit and systematic form alongside my formal graduate work in physics.

The name does not designate a new academic discipline. I use it as a working name for a continuing effort to examine what lies beneath successful scientific theories: their conceptual primitives, physical assumptions, inferential structures, empirical interfaces, and ontological commitments, as well as the historical and institutional conditions through which scientific knowledge is produced, communicated, preserved, and sometimes forgotten.

What is Fundamentology?

Fundamentology begins from a simple distinction: a scientific theory can be extraordinarily successful without every element of its formal description having the same physical or ontological status.

Equations may predict correctly. Mathematical structures may reveal deep regularities. Concepts may organize phenomena with exceptional efficiency. Yet further questions remain: What do these structures represent? Which distinctions are physically accessible? Which assumptions belong to the theory itself, and which have been inherited from earlier conceptual frameworks? When does successful representation justify a claim about physical reality?

The purpose of Fundamentology is not to replace established physical theories. It is to examine their conceptual and physical architecture, particularly at points where formal success can coexist with unresolved questions about measurement, explanation, ontology, and the limits of inference.

Why Fundamentology?

Modern physics contains theories of extraordinary predictive power, yet predictive success and conceptual closure are not the same thing.

A mathematical object may be indispensable without necessarily being a physical entity. An observable may be perfectly well defined within a formalism without every apparatus being physically capable of measuring it. A theory may describe evolution with great precision while leaving the status of time unsettled. A geometrical description may succeed while questions remain about what physical status should be assigned to geometry itself.

The same distinction appears beyond formal physics. Scientific metaphors may gradually be treated as literal descriptions of reality. Historical narratives may compress collective processes into a small number of celebrated names. Institutions may determine whether knowledge survives, travels, or disappears.

Fundamentology treats these not as unrelated problems, but as different manifestations of a broader question:

How does scientific knowledge acquire physical meaning, epistemic warrant, conceptual structure, and continuity?

Core Questions

What is a theory made of?

What are the conceptual primitives, inherited assumptions, mathematical structures, and inferential relations from which a physical theory is constructed?

What makes a theoretical distinction physically meaningful?

When does a distinction represented in a formalism correspond to something that can actually be prepared, controlled, measured, recorded, or otherwise physically accessed?

This question is central, for example, to my work on quantum measurement and observable attribution, where the mathematical existence of an observable and the physical capacity of an apparatus to warrant its attribution must be kept distinct.

What licenses an ontological commitment?

What additional grounds are required before moving from “the theory contains this structure” or “the model predicts successfully” to “this is something physically real”?

What is fundamental, and what is descriptive or emergent?

How should we distinguish fundamental physical structure from effective description, representation, collective organization, or emergent behaviour?

How are theories connected to observation?

What roles are played by measurement, observers, records, experimental interfaces, calibration, and operational accessibility in connecting formal structures to empirical evidence?

How does knowledge survive and acquire authority?

How do institutions, language, education, publication, law, finance, translation, memory, and systems of scientific credit influence what becomes visible, trusted, transmitted, and remembered as knowledge?

How the Inquiry Works

Although the subjects vary, a recurring method connects them.

Fundamentology begins by separating levels that are often compressed together:

mathematical representation → operational accessibility → empirical evidence → physical explanation → ontological interpretation

The central task is then to examine the bridges between these levels.

What exactly has been observed?
What has been inferred?
Which physical resources make that inference possible?
Which part of a claim comes from the formalism?
Which part comes from the experimental arrangement?
Which assumptions are inherited rather than experimentally established?
And what additional step turns a successful description into a statement about reality?

Historical and linguistic analysis perform a parallel function. Scientific concepts are examined not only for what they mean inside equations, but also for how their meanings were formed, transmitted, simplified, institutionalized, or transformed.

Across Physics and Science

Fundamentology has no fixed list of subject areas. The following are recurring sites at which these questions currently arise in my work.

Quantum Foundations

Measurement, observers, entanglement, quantum witnesses, observable attribution, the limits of operational inference, and the possibility of understanding quantum mechanics as an interface architecture.

My current book on quantum mechanics similarly separates empirical evidence, formalism, interpretation, and open questions before turning to the boundaries and possible self-sufficiency of the theory.

Time, Change & Dynamics

The relation between physical change and temporal description, the different functions performed by time in physical theories, and the architecture through which physical evolution is represented.

Spacetime, Geometry & Dimension

The physical status of dimension, curvature, geometrical structure, and spacetime, together with the question of when a mathematical geometry warrants an ontological interpretation.

Architecture of Physical Theories

The primitives, assumptions, dynamical structures, interfaces, explanatory commitments, and inferential organization built into the major frameworks of modern physics.

Collective & Emergent Phenomena

Plasma physics provides a particularly concrete setting for studying collective causation, Landau damping, phase mixing, effective description, information accessibility, and the relation between microscopic and collective levels.

Scientific Language & Conceptual Honesty

Scientific terminology and metaphor can assist understanding, but they can also conceal the distinction between model, interpretation, and physical claim. This line of work concerns the responsibilities associated with scientific language and public explanation.

History, Credit & Scientific Memory

Who becomes visible in the history of science, how credit is constructed and distributed, and how contributions can disappear through institutional and historiographical processes.

This question also structures my book Faceless Faces, which examines the gap between the collective production of science and the strongly individualized way in which scientific history is often remembered.

Institutions & the Continuity of Knowledge

How do money, law, organization, labour, education, texts, and institutional memory make knowledge capable of surviving beyond individual lives?

My work on Rabʿ-i Rashidi approaches this question historically by examining a fourteenth-century institution in which teaching, medicine, manuscript production, finance, administration, and succession were deliberately organized into a durable system.

Scientific Progress & Modes of Discovery

How does science actually advance? What different roles are played by theoretical construction, experimental exploration, conceptual reorganization, error correction, and inherited knowledge?

This question also motivates my developing work centred on Newton and Faraday as contrasting but complementary modes of scientific cognition.

An Independent Research Trajectory

Fundamentology did not begin as a formally defined research program. Its different questions emerged over many years and initially developed independently of one another.

Questions about time led to questions about change. Questions about geometry led to questions about measurement and observers. Problems in quantum mechanics raised broader questions about the relation between formalism and ontology. Plasma physics opened another route into emergence and collective causation. Historical work on scientific institutions and scientific credit eventually raised structurally similar questions about how knowledge itself is produced and sustained.

Only gradually did I recognize that many of these investigations were asking different versions of the same underlying question: what must be true for a scientific representation to become warranted knowledge about the physical world?

Fundamentology is the name I now use for that continuing trajectory.

It remains independent and open-ended. Its purpose is not to force diverse problems into a single theory, but to allow connections among them to become visible where they genuinely exist.

The longer-term aim is to develop this work through research, books, articles, discussion, and- where productive- collaboration with others working on related foundational questions.

A Working Principle

Distinguish what a theory calculates, what an experiment establishes, what a concept means, and what we are justified in saying exists.